One Million Views

Arctic-news blog has now received more than 1 Million views.

Thanks, contributors and all who read, shared, liked, commented and otherwise helped spread the word.

We feel strongly inspired, encouraged and obliged to keep on reporting on the dire situation in the Arctic.

Thank you!

Post by Sam Carana.

Arctic sea ice in steep decline

Arctic sea ice area is in steep decline. The yellow line on the image below shows the sea ice area for 2014 up to June 1st, showing an almost vertical fall over the past few days.

[ click on image to enlarge ]

The Naval Research Laboratory image below compares the May 14, 2014, sea ice concentration (left) with the sea ice concentration forecast for June 10, 2014 (run on June 2, 2014, on the right).

[ click on image to enlarge ]

The NOAA image below shows sea surface temperature anomalies on June 3rd, 2014.

The NOAA image shows the huge sea surface temperature anomalies all over the Northern Hemisphere on June 3rd, 2014. Large areas with sea surface temperature anomalies up to 8 degrees Celsius and higher show up in and around the Arctic Ocean

[ click on image to enlarge ]

The image below shows sea surface temperature anomalies up to 1.5 degrees Celsius over the May-June 2014 period, with global average anomalies that hover just above 1 degree Celsius.

Above sea surface anomalies are very high, much higher than historic annual temperature anomalies over land and oceans, as shown on the image below for comparison.

In conclusion, the situation spells bad news for the sea ice, also given the prospect of an El Niño event projected to occur later this year. As discussed in earlier posts, the sea ice is already very thin, and as this image shows, ocean heat is melting the sea ice from beneath, while the sun is warming up the ice from above. At this time of year, insolation in the Arctic is at its highest, as Earth reaches its maximum axial tilt toward the sun of 23° 26'. In fact, insolation during the months June and July is higher in the Arctic than anywhere else on Earth, as discussed at this earlier post.

Feedbacks further accelerate warming in the Arctic, as described in the earlier post Feedbacks in the Arctic. Temperature rises of the water close to the seafloor of the Arctic Ocean is very dangerous, as heat penetrating sediments there could cause hydrate destabilization, resulting in huge amounts of methane entering the atmosphere over the Arctic Ocean.

Obama's Power Plant Rules: Too Little, Too Late, Too Ineffective

On June 2, 2014, the Obama administration through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced that states must lower carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted for each unit (MWh) of electricity they produce.

1. Too Little

Under the EPA rules, the nationwide goal is to reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector by 30% from 2005 levels. This will also reduce other pollutants.

Sam Carana: The goal should be an 80% cut in emissions. Reductions should not be averaged out over different types of emissions, but instead the 80% reduction target should apply to each type of emission, i.e. 80% cuts in CO2 and 80% cuts in CH4 and 80% cuts in black carbon, etc.

2. Too late

Under the EPA rules, states must meet interim targets during the 2020s, but they can delay making emission cuts provided they will on average comply with targets by 2030. Moreover, the EPA suggests that they can from then on maintain that level subsequently.

Sam Carana: For over six years, I have been calling for an 80% cut in emissions by 2020. When people now ask if I still believe such reductions are feasible given the lack of action over the years, I respond that, precisely because so little has been achieved over the years, it now is even more imperative to set a target of 80% emissions cuts by 2020. If we start cutting 13.4% off this year's emissions, and keep cutting emissions by the same amount each subsequent year, we'll be under 20% (i.e. at 19.6%) by 2020. 

3. Too ineffective

Under the EPA rules, states could comply by either reducing CO2 emissions from their power plants or buying credits or offsets from elsewehere, e.g. through cap-and-trade programs. States can choose to use existing multi-state programs or create new ones.

Sam Carana: The goal should be a genuine 80% cut in emissions in each and every state. It is good to delegate decisions to states regarding what works best locally to achieve such reductions. However, schemes such as cap-and-trade, carbon credits and offsetting keep local polluters dirty by allowing them to claim credit for progress made elsewhere. A state buying credits from beyond its borders does not genuinely reduce its own emissions, making it even harder for it to reach its next targets (which should be even tighter), while also making it harder for targets to be reached elsewhere.  

The bigger such schemes grow, the more they become fraught with difficulties, twisted with irregularities and riddled with political chicanery, making them prone to fraud and bribery, often beyond the administrative scope and legal reach of local regulators. 

Such schemes are inherently counter-productive in that they seek to create ever more demand for polluting activities; they will continue doing dirty business until the last possible 'credit' has been sold, burning the last bit of fossil fuel from irrealistic carbon budgets that are fabricated inside the dark politics of compromise, campaign-funding and complacency. 

Such schemes are designed to profit from keeping the dirtiest power plants going and prolonging their lifetime beyond any reasonable purpose, in efforts to perpetuate the scheme itself and extract further money that, instead of being used to benefit the cleaner solutions, is then often used to finance further pollution elsewhere and spread the reach of such schemes. Such dreadful conduct is typically hidden away in a web of deceit custom-made to avoid the scrutiny of public accountibility.

And what if states fail to reach targets? The EPA suggestion to use such schemes effectively delays much local action, while encouraging states to negotiate with each other. This opens up the prospect of states blaming each other and taking legal action rather than genuine action. If the trappings of such schemes make states fail to reach targets, penalties could be imposed, but that still does not guarantee that targets will be reached; furthermore, given the complexities of such schemes, policing them poses additional burdens on administrators, police, courts and lawyers. Huge amounts of money and time have already been spent on court cases to postpone action, rather than on building genuine solutions.  

The best way to cater for non-compliance is to prepare federally-administered fees, to be levied on sales of polluting products, and with the revenues used to fund federal projects that do reduce emissions. As said, it's good for the EPA to encourage states to each work out how best to reduce their respective emissions, provided that each state does indeed reach set targets. Where a state fails to take the necessary action, the EPA should resume control and call for federal fees to be imposed in the respective state. 

The Clean Air Act calls for the 'best system of emissions reduction' to reduce emissions from power plants. The best system is one that levies fees on pollution and then uses the revenues to fund rebates on the cleaner products sold locally.  

Such combinations of fees and rebates (feebates) are the most effective way to make our economy sustainable, as part of the comprehensive action that is needed to avoid climate catastrophe. For more details on comprehensive and effective action, see the ClimatePlan blog. 

Related

- Methane Man
http://arctic-news.blogspot.com/2014/01/methane-man.html

- Climate Plan
http://climateplan.blogspot.com

Support methanetracker.org

by Harold Hensel

I keep thinking of this experience when I see that methane has now blanketed the entire globe with the highest concentrations in the northern hemisphere. I was signing up a young man for property insurance. We discussed coverage's and how much coverage he needed. We got almost to the end of the routine underwriting questions and I got to the one about if he had ever been convicted of arson. He said yes! Then he said, do you think that will make a difference? Do we think that the globe being blanketed with methane will make a difference?

Methanetracker.org is an important service and it is brought to you by one person, Omar Cabrera from Houston. There is nothing else like it on the internet. He has spent $30,000 of his own money to make methanetracker.org free to the public. He feels this strongly about the methane issue. If you notice the slider bar, it stops at 4/20/2014. He needs to upgrade and has run out of money to do it. He has not asked for money until he ran out of money. Methanetracker.org is very important and he should not be trying to go it alone. I think we should chip in to help him keep methane tracker going. He doesn't need that much. How to help is on the http://www.methanetracker.org/ web site.

How many deaths could result from failure to act on climate change?

A recent OECD analysis concludes that outdoor air pollution is killing more than 3.5 million people a year globally. The OECD estimates that people in its 34 Member countries would be willing to pay USD 1.7 trillion to avoid deaths caused by air pollution. Road transport is likely responsible for about half.

[ from an earlier post ]

A 2012 report by DARA calculated that 5 million people were dying each year from climate change and carbon economies, mostly from indoor smoke and (outdoor) air pollution.

Back in 2012, a Reuters report calculated that this could add up to a total number of 100 million deaths over the coming two decades. This suggests, however, that failure to act on climate change will not cause even more deaths due to other causes.

Indeed, failure to act on climate change could result in many more deaths due to other causes, in particular food shortages. As temperatures rise, ever more extreme weather events can be expected, such as flooding, heatwaves, wildfires, droughts, and subsequent crop loss, famine, disease, heat-stroke, etc.

So, while currently most deaths are caused by indoor smoke and outdoor air pollution, in case of a failure to act on climate change the number of deaths can be expected to rise most rapidly among people hit by heat stress, famine, fresh water shortages, as well as wars over who controls access to land, food, fresh water, etc.

How high could figures rise? Below is an update of an image from the earlier post Arctic Methane Impact with a scale in both Celsius and Fahrenheit added on the right, illustrating the danger that temperature will rise to intolerable levels if little or no action is taken on climate change. The inset shows projected global number of annual climate-related deaths for these two scenarios, i.e. little or no action, and also shows a third scenario of comprehensive and effective action that instead seeks to bring temperature rise under control.

[ click on image to enlarge ]

For further details on comprehensive and effective climate action, see the ClimatePlan.


Links

• The Cost of Air Pollution | OECD analysis, published May 2014
http://www.oecd.org/environment/cost-of-air-pollution.htm

• DARA Climate Vulnerability Monitor
http://daraint.org/climate-vulnerability-monitor/climate-vulnerability-monitor-2012/

• 100 mln will die by 2030 if world fails to act on climate - report | REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/25/climate-inaction-idINDEE88O0HH20120925

• Arctic Methane Impact
https://arctic-news.blogspot.com/2013/11/arctic-methane-impact.html

• Is death by lead worse than death by climate? No. | by Paul Beckwith
https://arctic-news.blogspot.com/2012/10/is-death-by-lead-worse-than-death-by-climate-no.html

• Climate Plan
https://arctic-news.blogspot.com/p/climateplan.html

Large Falls in Arctic Sea Ice Thickness over May 2014

Comparing ice thickness (in meters) on May 2, 2014 (left) and May 30, 2014 (right, forecast run May 25, 2014)

Arctic sea ice has shown large falls in thickness in many areas over the course of May 2014, as shown on above image. The animation below also compares the situation between May 2, 2014, and May 30, 2014 (as forecast by Naval Research Laboratory on May 23, 2014). Ice thickness is in meters.

Thickness is an important indicator of the vulnerability of the ice. If only looking at sea ice extent, one might (wrongly) conclude that sea ice retreat was only minor and that everything looked fine. By contrast, when looking at thickness, it becomes evident that large falls have occurred over the course of May 2014.

Falls at the edges of the sea ice can be expected at this time of the year, but the large fall closer to the center is frightening. On the one hand, it appears to reflect cyclonic weather and subsequent drift of the ice. On the other hand, it also indicates how vulnerable the sea ice has become. Last year, a large area showed up at the center of the sea ice where the ice became very thin, as discussed in July 2013 in the post Open Water at North Pole and again in the September 2013 post North Hole.

The appearance of huge weak areas at the center of the sea ice adds to its vulnerability and increases the prospect of total sea ice collapse, in case of one or more large cyclones hitting the Arctic Ocean later this year. To highlight the dangerous situation, the main image from a post earlier this month is again added below.

Adding to the concerns are huge sea surface temperature anomalies, as illustrated by the image below, showing anomalies at May 23, 2014, and created by Harold Hensel with ClimateReanalyzer and Google Earth.

[ click on image to enlarge ]

The image below shows sea surface anomalies on May 26, 2014, with an overlay of land temperatures, as created by Harold Hensel and edited by Sam Carana.

The image shows sea surface temperatures on the Northern Hemisphere that are 1.44 degrees Celsius warmer than the baselline temperature, despite large areas with cold water partly resulting from the huge amounts of meltwater flowing down along the edges of Greenland into the North Atlantic Ocean. The graph below shows Northern Hemisphere and Global sea surface temperature anomalies over May 2014.

By comparison, current (May 27, 2014) surface temperature anomalies of 0.64°C globally and 0.84°C for the NH. The image below shows annual temperature anomalies (land and ocean data).

Meanwhile, the development of this year's 'north hole' at the center of the sea ice appears to persist, as illustrated by the image below.

The real budgetary emergency and the myth of "burnable carbon"

by David Spratt

How fast and how profoundly we act to stop climate change caused by human actions, and work to return to a safe climate, is perhaps the greatest challenge our species has ever faced, but are we facing up to what really needs to be done?

We have to come to terms with two key facts: practically speaking, there is no longer a "carbon budget" for burning fossil fuels while still achieving a two-degree Celsius (2°C) future; and the 2°C cap is now known to be dangerously too high.

No Carbon Budget Left - David Spratt from Breakthrough  -  "We have no carbon budget left
for burning of fossils fuels - emergency action is now the only viable path"  - David Spratt

For the last two decades, climate policy-making has focused on 2°C of global warming impacts as being manageable, and a target achievable by binding international treaties and incremental, non-disruptive, adjustments to economic incentives and regulations (1).

But former UK government advisor Professor Sir Robert Watson says the idea of a 2°C target "is largely out of the window”, International Energy Agency chief economist Fatih Birol calls it "a nice Utopia", and international negotiations chief Christiana Figueres says we need "a miracle". This is because, in their opinions, emissions will not be reduced sufficiently to keep to the necessary "carbon budget" (2).

The carbon budget has come to public prominence in recent years, including in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report in 2013, as being the difference between the total allowable greenhouse gas emissions for 2°C of warming, and the amount already emitted or spent. The budget varies according to the likelihood of overshooting the target: the higher the risk, the bigger the budget. In the IPCC report, no carbon budget is given for less than a one-in-three chance of failure.

At that one-in-three risk of failure, the IPCC says the total budget is 790 GtC (gigatons, or one billion tons, of carbon), less emissions to 2011 of 515 GtC, leaving a budget of 275 GtC in 2011, or ~245 GtC in 2014 (3).

What is less well understood is that if the risk is low, there is no carbon budget left (4).

Breakthrough National  Climate Restoration
Forum 21-22 June,  Melbourne

Climate change with its non-linear events, tipping points and irreversible events – such as mass extinctions, destruction of ecosystems, the loss of large ice sheets and the triggering of large-scale releases of greenhouse gases from carbon stores such as permafrost and methane clathrates – contains many possibilities for catastrophic failure.

Ian Dunlop, a former senior risk manager and oil and coal industry executive, says the management of catastrophic risk has to be very different from current processes. As serious, irreversible outcomes are likely, this demands very low probabilities of failure: management of catastrophic risk "must centre around contingency planning for high-impact and what were regarded as low-probability events, which unfortunately are now becoming more probable… Major, high-risk industrial operations, such as offshore oil exploration, provide a model, with detailed contingency planning and sequential barriers being put in place to prevent worst-case outcomes" (5).

If a risk-averse (pro-safety) approach is applied – say, of less than 10% probability of exceeding the 2°C target – to carbon budgeting, there is simply no budget available, because it has already been used up. A study from The Centre for Australian Weather and Climate Research shows that "the combination of a 2°C warming target with high probability of success is now unreachable" using the current suite of policy measures, because the budget has expired (6).

This is illustrated in Figure 1 where, as we move to the right (greater probability of meeting target) along the blue line which is the 2°C carbon budget, we reach a point around 90% probability (blue circle) where the total budget intersects with what we have already emitted.

As well, on-going greenhouse emissions associated with food production and deforestation are often conveniently pushed to one side in discussing carbon budgets. UK scientists have shown that if some reasonably optimistic assumptions are made about deforestation and food-related emissions for the rest of the century, then most emission reduction scenarios are incompatible with holding warming to +2ºC, even with a high 50% probability of exceeding the target. In other words, food and deforestation has taken up the remaining budget, leaving no space for fossil fuel emissions (7).

In addition, the carbon budget analysis makes optimistic and risky assumptions about the stability of Arctic, and of polar and other carbon stores such as permafrost. As one example, the modelling discussed in the IPCC report projects an area of summer Arctic sea-ice cover in the year 2100 higher that actually exists at the moment, yet there is a great deal more warming and sea-ice loss to come this century! In fact, many Arctic specialists think the Arctic will be sea-ice free in summer within the next decade, with consequences for global warming that the carbon budget calculations have significantly underestimated. (8)

Australian Climate Council member Prof. Will Steffen says the IPCC carbon budget may "be rather generous". The IPCC report says the modelling used does not include explicit representation of permafrost soil carbon decomposition in response to future warming, and does not consider slow feedbacks associated associated with vegetation changes and ice sheets. Recent research suggests these events could happen well below 2°C of warming, so they should be taken into account, but they are not.

Accounting for the possible release of methane from melting permafrost and ocean sediment implies a substantially lower budget (9). This reinforces the need to take a pro-safety, risk-averse approach to the carbon budget, especially since some research suggests that Arctic permafrost may be vulnerable at less than 2°C or warming (10).

For all these reasons – that is, prudent catastrophic risk management, accounting for food production and deforestation emissions, and for Arctic sea ice and carbon store instability – the idea of "burnable carbon" – that is, how much more coal, gas and oil we can burn and still keep under 2°C – is a dangerous illusion, based on unrealistic, high-risk, assumptions.

A second consideration is that 2°C of warming is not a safe target. Instead, it's the boundary between dangerous and very dangerous (11), and 1°C higher than experienced during the whole period of human civilisation (12), illustrated in Figure 2. The last time greenhouse gas levels were as high as they are today, modern humans did not exist (13), so we are conducting an experiment for which we have no direct observable evidence from our own history, and for which we do not know the full result.

However, we do understand that many major ecosystems will be lost, a 2°C sea-level rise will eventually be measured in the tens of metres (14), and much of human civilisation and large, productive river delta systems will be swamped. There is now evidence to suggest that the current conditions affecting the West Antarctic ice sheet are sufficient to drive between 1.2 and 4 metres of sea rise (15), and evidence that Greenland will contribute more quickly (16), and they are just two contributors to rising sea levels.

It is now clear that the incremental-adjustment 2°C strategy has run out of time, if for no other reason than the "budget" for burning more fossil fuels is now zero, yet the global economy is still deeply committed to their continuing widespread use.

We all wish the incremental-adjustment 2°C strategy had worked, but it hasn't. It has now expired as a practical plan.

We now have a choice to make: accept much higher levels of warming of 3–5°C that will destroy most species, most people and most of the world's ecosystems; a set of impacts some more forthright scientists say are incompatible with the maintenance of human civilisation.

Or we can conceive of a safe-climate emergency-action approach which would aim to reduce global warming back to the range of conditions experienced during the last 10,000 years, the period of human civilisation and fixed settlement. This would involve fast and large emissions reduction through radical energy demand reductions, whilst a vast scaling-up of clean energy production was organised, together with the remaking of many of our essential systems such as transport and food production, with the target being zero net emissions. In addition, there would need to be a major commitment to atmospheric carbon dioxide drawdown measures. This would need to be done at a speed and scale more akin to the "war economy", where social and economic priority is given to what is perceived to be an overwhelming existential threat.

After 30 years of climate policy and action failure, we are in deep trouble and now have to throw everything we can muster at the climate challenge. This will be demanding and disruptive, because there are no longer any non-radical, incremental paths available.

Prof. Kevin Anderson and Dr Alice Bows, writing in the journal Nature, say that "any contextual interpretation of the science demonstrates that the threshold of 2°C is no longer viable, at least within orthodox political and economic constraints" and that "catastrophic and ongoing failure of market economics and the laissez-faire rhetoric accompanying it (unfettered choice, deregulation and so on) could provide an opportunity to think differently about climate change" (17).

Anderson says there is no longer a non-radical option, and for developed economies to play an equitable role in holding warming to 2°C (with 66% probability), emissions compared to 1990 levels would require at least a 40% reduction by 2018, 70% reduction by 2024, and 90% by 2030. This would require "in effect a Marshall plan for energy supply". As well low-carbon supply technologies cannot deliver the necessary rate of emission reductions and they need to be complemented with rapid, deep and early reductions in energy consumption, what he calls a radical emission reduction strategy (18). All this suggests that even holding warming to a too-high 2°C limit now requires an emergency approach.

Emergency action has proven fair and necessary for great social and economic challenges we have faced before. Call it the great disruption, the war economy, emergency mode, or what you like; the story is still the same, and it is now the only remaining viable path.

keynote speaker, David Spratt, explains why there is no carbon budget left to burn.

Sources:
This article was originally published at ClimateCodeRed.org
Above video, NO CARBON BUDGET LEFT TO BURN, was uploaded by Breakthrough.



Notes

1. Jaeger, C.C. and J. Jaeger (2011), "Three views of two degrees", Reg. Environ. Change, 11: S15-S26; Anderson, K. and A. Bows (2012) “A new paradigm for climate change”, Nature Climate Change 2: 639-70
2. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-19348194; http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/may/29/carbon-emissions-nuclearpow; http://www.smh.com.au/environment/weather/climate-pioneers-see-little-chance-of-avoiding-dangerous-global-warming-20131105-2wyon.html
3. IPCC (2013) "Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Climate Change 2013; The Physical Science Basis: Summary for Policymakers"
4. "For a 90% probability of not exceeding 2C of warming the carbon budget had reduced to zero by 2012, using a multi-agent (that is, the well-mixed greenhouse gases, including CO2 and CH4)", Raupach (2013, unpublished), based on Raupach, M. R., I.N. Harman and J.G. Canadell (2011) "Global climate goals for temperature, concentrations, emissions and cumulative emissions", Report for the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency. CAWCR Technical Report no. 42. Centre for Australian Weather and Climate Research, Melbourne; Rogelj, J., W. Hare et al. (2011) "Emission pathways consistent with a 2°C global temperature limit", Nature Climate Change 1: 413-418 show at Table 1 no feasible pathways for limiting warming to 2°C during the twenty-first century with a "very likely" (>90%) chance of staying below the target, without carbon drawdown.
5. Dunlop, I. (2011), "Managing catastrophic risk", Centre for Policy Development, 
http://cpd.org.au/2011/07/ian-dunlop-managing-catastrophic-risk/
6. Raupach, M. R., I.N. Harman and J.G. Canadell (2011) "Global climate goals for temperature, concentrations, emissions and cumulative emissions", Report for the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency. CAWCR Technical Report no. 42. Centre for Australian Weather and Climate Research, Melbourne. 
7. Anderson, K. and A. Bows (2008) “Reframing the climate change challenge in light of post-2000 emission trends”, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 366: 3863-3882; Anderson, K. and A. Bows (2011) “Beyond ‘dangerous’ climate change: emission scenarios for a new world”, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 369: 20–44
8. Wadhams, P. (2012) “Arctic ice cover, ice thickness and tipping points”, AMBIO 41: 23–33; Maslowski, W., C.J. Kinney et al. (2012) "The Future of Arctic Sea Ice", The Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, 40: 625-654
9. IPCC (2013) "Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Climate Change 2013; The Physical Science Basis;
10. Vaks, A., O.S. Gutareva et al. (2013) “Speleothems Reveal 500,000-Year History of Siberian Permafrost”, Science 340: 183-186; Schaefer, K., T. Zhang et al. (2011) "Amount and timing of permafrost carbon release in response to climate warming", Tellus 63:165-180
11. Anderson, K. and A. Bows (2011) “Beyond ‘dangerous’ climate change: emission scenarios for a new world”, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 369: 20–44
12. Marcott, S.A, J.D. Shakun et al. (2013) "A Reconstruction of Regional and Global Temperature for the Past 11,300 Years", Science 339: 1198-120; Hansen, J., P. Kharecha et al. (2013) "Assessing 'dangerous climate change': Required reduction of carbon emissions to protect young people, future generations and nature", Plos One 8: 1-26
13. Tripadi, A.K., C.D. Roberts et al. (2009), "Coupling of CO2 and Ice Sheet Stability Over Major Climate Transitions of the Last 20 Million Years", Science 326: 1394-1397
14. Rohling, E. J.,K. Grant et al. (2009) “Antarctic temperature and global sea level closely coupled over the past five glacial cycles”, Nature GeoScience, 21 June 2009 `af
15. NASA (2014), "NASA-UCI Study Indicates Loss of West Antarctic Glaciers Appears Unstoppable", Media release, 12 May 2014, http://www.nasa.gov/press/2014/may/nasa-uci-study-indicates-loss-of-west-antarctic-glaciers-appears-unstoppable, accessed 19 May 2014; Rignot, E., J. Mouginot et al. (2014) "Widespread, rapid grounding line retreat of Pine Island, Thwaites, Smith and Kohler glaciers, West Antarctica from 1992 to 2011", Geophysical Research Letters, doi: 10.1002/2014GL060140; Joughin, I., B.E. Smith et al. (2014), "Marine Ice Sheet Collapse Potentially Under Way for the Thwaites Glacier Basin, West Antarctica", Science 344: 735 -738
16. NASA (2014), "Hidden Greenland Canyons Mean More Sea Level Rise", Media release, 19 May 2014, http://www.nasa.gov/press/2014/may/hidden-greenland-canyons-mean-more-sea-level-rise, accessed 19 May 2014; Morlighem, M., E. Rignot et al. (2014), "Deeply incised submarine glacial valleys beneath the Greenland ice sheet", Nature Geoscience, doi:10.1038/ngeo2167
17. Anderson, K. and A. Bows (2012) “A new paradigm for climate change”, Nature Climate Change 2: 639-70
18. Anderson, K. (2014) "Why carbon prices can’t deliver the 2°C target", 13 August 2013, http://kevinanderson.info/blog/why-carbon-prices-cant-deliver-the-2c-target, accessed 19 May 2014; Anderson, K. (2012) "Climate change going beyond dangerous – Brutal numbers and tenuous hope", Development Dialogue, September 2012; Anderson, K. (2011) "Climate change going beyond dangerous – Brutal numbers and tenuous hope or cognitive dissonance", presentation 5 July 2011, slides available at http://www.slideshare.net/DFID/professor-kevin-anderson-climate-change-going-beyond-dangerous; plus (7) above.